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Abstract 
New Public Management (NPM) has played a decisive role and has had a radical effect on the 
productivity and efficiency of the public sector in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, the 
effective introduction of the NPM reforms is not an easy task. The scientific community is 
zealously analyzing the experiences of the developing countries. The stories, they tell, are full 
of failures, and ineffective reforms. The goal of the current study is to uncover the factors that 
might influence the successful implementation of the NPM reforms. In our analysis, by 
relying on the theories of new institutional economics, we developed a model with which we 
wish to prove that in regards to the success of the reforms the informal and the formal 
institutions characteristic of the given country are the decisively determining factors. When 
answering the question, we introduced a new indicator based on public choice theory – the 
politicians’ interest index – by which we could measure the success of the NPM. We tested 
our hypothesis by a comparative statistical analysis using the data from 31 countries. Based 
on our results, we find that informal institutions, the culture shared by the members of society, 
fundamentally determine the probability of the successful implementation of the NPM 
reforms, these results having a significant practical relevance. 
 
Introduction 
In the developed Western democracies public sector reforms have been continuously on 
the agenda for the past 30 years. The utilization of the experiences accumulated in old 
European Union member states and in Anglo-Saxon countries is an obvious idea when 
considering undertaking modernizing efforts in Central-Eastern-European countries. Reforms 
concerning the public sector that were realized in the West not only encompassed structural, 
system-wide changes, but also that emphasis was placed on the transformation of the 
management and managing principles of the public sphere. New Public Management (NPM) 
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has played a decisive role and has had a radical effect on the productivity and efficiency of the 
public sector in the United Kingdom, in New Zealand, in the United States and in Australia. 
(Barzelay 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaer 2004; Pollitt, van Thiel and Homburg 2007) As a result 
of the successes of the NPM in the 1980’s and 1990’s, NPM has became almost a mandatory 
element of the governmental reform efforts, so it is not accidental that the adaptation of the 
NPM techniques and the learning process that goes with them is financially supported by the 
European Union in the new member states as well. 
However, the effective introduction of the NPM reforms is not an easy task. The scientific 
community is zealously analyzing the experiences of the developing / less developed 
countries, including Central Eastern European countries.2 The stories, they tell, are full of 
failures, and ineffective reforms. (Beblavy 2002; Bouckaert and others 2009; Lodge and Gill 
2011; Marobela 2008; Meyer-Sahling 2009). According to our assumption, NPM is not 
applicable everywhere. It is not a globally adaptable integrated tool set; rather it is more like 
an approach and a value system, to which numerous management instruments can be fitted. 
According to our hypothesis the introduction of management methods belonging to this 
approach can only be effective, if these instruments fit the informal and formal institutional 
system followed and applied by the society of the given country which try to apply these. The 
institutional fit is necessary, but not sufficient condition of the successful introduction of a 
given NPM technique. The talent or inadequacy of the government that is carrying out the 
implementation, and other external environmental factors that are prevailing in a given place 
and time can fundamentally influence the success of the implementation. In the current study 
we exclusively focus on the institutional factors. The reason is that according to our 
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hypothesis, based on the new institutional economics, the institutional fit determines which 
reforms worth carrying out in a given institutional environment. A given society’s 
institutional system shows strong stability in the short- and in the mid-run, so in the given 
decision situation it should be considered as a basic condition, the knowledge of which has a 
fundamental importance for the decision makers. 
The objective of our study is to scientifically analyze and to answer the following 
questions: 
− Do informal and formal institutions influence, and if yes, then how and to what extent, the 
opportunities for the successful implementation of the management techniques being 
introduced under the rubric of the NPM movement? 
− What kind of institutional framework, in other words informal and formal institutional 
constellation, is necessary in a given country for successfully implementing a reform 
belonging to the NPM movement? 
− Can a successfully applied NPM reform from a given institutional environment be 
successfully replicated in another, different institutional environment? 
Besides these, the author of the study wishes to answer the question, if the above 
described hypothesis is confirmed: 
− Can the reforms belonging to the NPM movement be successfully introduced and 
sustained in the long-run taking into account the cluster of institutional and cultural 
pattern of Hungary?3 
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 4
The applied model 
Following the introduction of the hypotheses, the applied model is presented in this 
chapter. However, before the presentation of the structure of our model in details, we wish to 
clarify the notion of the “model” in social sciences. 
There are numerous definitions for the word “model” in the literature. (Hofstede 1981, 16; 
Hy - Wollscheid 2008) The development of a scientific model is one of the decisive phases of 
the theory building process, when we attempt to analyze a social scientific phenomenon that 
has “relatively stable pattern” (Leontief, 1986, 4) in a way that we are aware of the number of 
factors influencing the given phenomenon. Finally, we only concentrate on those that in our 
opinion are the most important ones. An important characteristic of scientific model building 
is that it is based on the theories accepted by the scientific community and that it can be tested 
empirically. The result of the test is accessible and reproducible by anyone. Thus, this way the 
models contribute to the development of science: by building on the theories accepted in the 
given time period, by either refuting or expanding them, they lead to new theories. 
When developing our model we considered the above described principles. Thus we set 
out from the theories of the new institutional school, and we only included in our analysis 
those explanatory variables responsible for the success of the reforms belonging to the NPM 
movement, which we considered as the most important ones. We quantified, with the aid of 
proxy variables, the given blocks of the model, in other words the informal and formal 
institutions. We followed up that by running the model with the help of statistical methods we 
tested our hypotheses. 
During the development of the model we set out from the model of Williamson (1998 and 
2000), which is depicted in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. 
The Economics of Institutions 
 
Source: Williamson (2000, 597) 
 
Level Frequency Purpose 
Embeddedness: 
 
informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, norms 
religion 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
Institutional environment: 
 
formal rules of the game – 
esp. property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
Governance: 
 
play of the game – esp. 
Contract (aligning 
governance structures with 
transactions) 
Resource allocation and 
employment (prices and 
quantities; incentive 
alignment) 
102 to 103 
10 to 102 
1 to 10 
continuous 
Often noncalculative; 
spontaneous […] 
Get the institutional 
environment right. 
1st order economizing 
Get the governance 
structures right. 
2nd order economizing 
Get the marginal conditions 
right. 
3rd order economizing 
L3: transaction cost economics 
L 4: neoclassical economics / agency theory 
L 1: social theory 
L 2: economics of property rights / positive 
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Based on Figure 1, Williamson’s model is briefly introduced. The first level of the model 
contains those factors, which – according to our hypothesis – decisively influence the 
successful implementation of NPM reforms. These factors have been often considered, even 
by the new institutional economists, as givens. According to Williamson (1998), these include 
the rules that even unconsciously followed by the members of society. North (1991, 97) called 
this block informal institutions, and he classified social norms, traditions and habits under this 
group. It is in this block of our model, where we apply the notion of culture in Hofstede’s 
sense, since as Hofstede and Hofstede (2005, 36) writes: 
 
“Culture is the unwritten book with rules of the social game that is passed on the 
newcomers by its members, nesting itself in their minds.” 
 
The second level contains those formal systems of rules that North (1984) calls formal 
institutions, and which include the system of property rights, the constitution and laws. These 
are the formal rules of the game, which obtain their form and become accountable in the 
social space created by informal institutions. 
The strength of the regulating power of formal institutions varies across cultures; in 
certain societies it is stronger, while in others it is weaker. The contribution of the formal 
institutions to the regulation of the social processes (as formal rules of the game) 
fundamentally depends on informal institutions.4 In regard to these interrelations and 
mechanisms, numerous open questions exist. In any event, based on research the historical 
determination of these processes is clear. (Greif 2006; Greif and Tabellini 2010) The 
changing of the informal and the formal rules of the game is also a slow process, which take 
place according to Williamson (1998, 28) primarily through the influence of external factors, 
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2008; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Redmond 2005; Williamson 2009) 
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such as a result of civil wars, economic crises, foreign occupation, and collapse of political 
systems. 
For the third and forth factors, namely the changes of the government and resource 
allocations, we can bring up examples from our lives as well. These levels usually pertain to 
the current workings of the system within the framework defined by the rules of the game 
established by the first and second levels. While the first two levels regulate what the social 
actors can do, the other levels place the emphasis on the question of how. 
As already mentioned, the first block of our model includes the notion of national culture 
as well. According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005, 6-9) culture is built up like an onion. At 
its core, we can find those social values that are extremely resistant, so in time they rarely 
change and in a given moment they can be considered as unchangeable. Whereas the outer 
layers of the onion consisting of the rituals, heroes, symbols – that are jointly called by 
Hofstede as “practices” – change more easily and faster during the course of time. When 
combining Hofstede and Hofstede’s (2005) notion of culture and Williamson’s (1998) 
institutional economics we must keep in mind that the first level that is called by Williamson 
“embeddedness” basically corresponds to the inner core of Hofstede’s cultural onion, namely 
to the values. 
In the next section the model by which we wish to analyze the likelihood of the successful 
implementation of the NPM reforms is introduced. The model is quite simple, with a static 
structure, and it contains all together four explanatory and one outcome blocks. In Figure 2. 
the interaction between the various blocks are not indicated separately in order to simplify the 
introduction of the model, since the main direction of causality according to our hypothesis is 
clearly heading from block 1. through blocks 2., 3, and 4. to the outcome variable. All of this, 
however, does not mean that during the statistical analysis the interactions do not come to 
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light, only that we find it sufficient to call attention to the main cause and effect interrelation, 
when illustrating the model.5 
During the description of the model each of its blocks are depicted. Following the 
introduction of the independent variables, the measurements of the success of the NPM 
reforms are reviewed. Capturing the notion of success is key to the workings of the model, so 
our recommended technique is described in more details. The operationalization of success is 
necessary when we wish to determine the likelihood of a successful implementation of an 
NPM reform. 
We will not deal in details with all blocks of our model, since in order to answer our 
research question it is sufficient to examine and to empirically test only the first two blocks 
and the success of the NPM reforms. The reason behind this is that primarily we are interested 
in the “what” question, in other words under what framework of conditions it is worth to set 
out to implement an NPM reform. As a result, we are exclusively focusing on the analysis of 
the necessary, but not sufficient conditions: we are examining the relationship between the 
informal and formal institutional system and the reforms belonging to the NPM movements.6 
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 The analysis does not cover the examination of the necessary conditions (3. and 4. blocks). Therefore, in the 
case of those countries of which we can state that their reform attempt was futile, we cannot decide 
unequivocally whether it was unsuccessful, because the approach of the NPM movement did not fit the 
institutional system of the country, or merely the decision makers of the given time period did not possess the 
appropriate competence and skills (3. block) for the successful implementation of an NPM reform, or the 
interrelations between the NPM reforms (4. block) being introduced impede the successful reforms.  
However, by the analysis of the first two blocks we can gain information about the third block as well. As Pillay 
(2008, 380) states: „Generally speaking, managers and leaders, as well as the people they work with, are part of a 
national society. In understanding their behaviour, one has to understand the society they live and function in.” 
Moreover, we would like to call attention to that based on our analysis even in the case of the unsuccessful 
countries we will be able to decide with a great probability – but unequivocally – whether a given country was 
incapable of the successfully implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement, because of its 
institutional system or other factors, such as the lack of government abilities that caused the failure. If a 
country’s institutional system is the same, or mainly similar, to the ones of the successful countries and yet its 
attempt to implement the NPM reforms was futile, then in the case of this country we can assume that the failure 
was not caused by the relationship to the institutional factors, rather it is explained by other causes, for instance it 
is linked to the government’s abilities and the organizational culture dominant in the public sector.  
The analysis of the 4. block namely the reforms that influence each other in a given time period is to be 
particularly emphasized. During the introduction of the NPM reforms there can be an optimal order, which is to 
be followed by the decision makers in order to achieve success. Besides this, certain NPM instruments formulate 
 9
According to our hypothesis there will be a strong correlation between the first two blocks of 
the model (informal and formal institutions) and the successful implementation and 
application of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
conflicting expectations and objectives, so their concurrent introduction – because of the conflicting objectives - 
will lead to failure. 
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Figure 2.  
The causality between the factors determining the successful implementation of the NPM 
 
Source: Own figure 
Other influencing factors appearing in the literature: economic pressures, political support, social changes (for instance: growth in the number of skilled 
workers), political changes (weakening powers of the unions, increasing power of the non-elected public officials), changes in the civil sector (weakening of 
the professional interest groups, for instance: teachers, medical doctors, etc.), political party systems, technological changes, pressures from the international 
organizations, fashion, etc. (Borins 2002; Drechsler 2005; Hood 1991 and 1995) 
1. block 
Informal institutions 
Informal rules of the game 
North (1990) and Williamson 
(1998 and 2000) 
Embeddedness 
Granovetter (1990), 
Williamson (1998) and Nee 
(2005) 
National values in the 
Hofstedeian sense 
Hofstede and Hofstede 
(2005) 
2. block 
Formal Institutions 
Formal rules of the 
game 
North (1990) and 
Williamson (1998) 
3. block 
Governmental competences 
and skills 
The structure and culture of civil 
services and governmental 
administration 
Result-block 
 
The probability of 
the successful 
introduction of the 
NPM technique 
Based on the scientific 
literature 
4. block 
Interaction between 
the simultaneously 
introduced NPM 
reforms 
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First block, informal institutions7 
Informal institutions are the rules, unconsciously accepted and spontaneously followed by 
the individual, which make social coordination more fluent. (Hodgson 2006; North 1990 and 
1991; Williamson 1998 and 2000) They are the most efficient coordination instruments of the 
relationships between the many millions of actors making up society with various individual 
interests.8 Informal institutions change slowly, which is one of their main virtues, but this 
characteristic of theirs has drawbacks as well. They provide security in the changing world, 
but they hinder the development of the given society. It is difficult to say how informal 
institutions arise. Fundamentally they are a product of a learning process, which stems from 
the collective processing of past events. Societies experience a great deal of internal and 
external influences during their history. The survival of a given group/society depends on the 
successful answers given to these influences. The repeatedly successful solutions become 
embedded in the subconscious of the members of society and they help the successful 
adaptation of the members of society in the long-run. Embeddedness also means that the 
members of society unconsciously rely on these informal institutions for the solution of 
certain situations.  
Informal institutions, independent of which definition we begin with, are intertwined with 
the notion of culture.9 According to Hofstede (1984, 389): 
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 Granovetter (1985) does not consider the notion of institutional determination, which is in the focus of new 
institutional economists, as sufficient, since according to him this does not mean a significant shift from the 
methodological individualism of neoclassical economics. Instead of institutional determination, Granovetter 
(1985, 490) emphasizes the concept of embeddedness: “The embeddedness argument stresses instead the role of 
concrete personal relations and structures (or “networks”) of such relations in generating trust and discouraging 
malfeasance. The widespread preference for transacting with individuals of known reputation implies that few 
are actually content to rely on either generalized morality or institutional arrangements to guard against trouble.” 
Granovetter relies more strongly on the notion of trust than new institutional economists do. For him, the 
development of trust is of primary importance, which he captures with the concept of embeddedness. However, 
in the case of institutions if an adequate level of trust exists towards the institutional system and towards the 
state, which is in charge of the enforcement of institutions, then it is not necessary to have high level of trust 
between the transacting parties. 
9
 This is also stated by Pejovich (1999, 166): “Thus, informal institutions are the part of a community’s heritage 
that we call culture.” See also: (Roland 2004). 
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“Culture can be defined as the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another.” 
 
Hofstede’s definition allows for a broad interpretation, in any case the “collective 
programming of the mind” highlights certain characteristics of culture. Programming means 
that the system automatically answers to certain effects with a given response. Capturing 
culture through programming makes it clear that informal institutions like traditions, also 
called by North informal constraints, are identical notions to culture, at least from the 
perspective of that both culture and the informal institutions are the efficient coordinating 
instruments of social – including even the economic and political – transactions.10 
 
Second block, formal institutions11 
Following Williamson in the second block we wish to capture formal institutions. 
Williamson (1998, 27) classifies the following into the second block: public policy decision 
making, legislation and bureaucracy, the constitution, laws and property rights. Williamson 
(2000, 598) defines the second block as the following: 
 
„Constrained by the shadow of the past, the design instruments at Level 2 include the 
executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the 
distribution of powers across different levels of government (federalism). The definition 
and enforcement of property rights and of contract laws are important features.” 
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Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Schedler and Proeller 2007) 
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 See the proxy variables of the formal institutions in the appendix, table 2. 
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This definition is very important in regards to the selection of the proxy variables! In order 
to capture the second block, it worth to capture the following with proxy variables: legal 
system, political system – including for instance the electoral system, the relationship and the 
distribution of power between the local government system and the central government. In 
addition to this of course, we must measure in some way the strength of property rights and 
contract enforcement, when we include this block into our model. 
The further characteristic of formal institutions is that they increase the stability of the 
workings of society by extorting the expected conforming behaviour from the members of 
society. (North and others 2007) This is necessary, because social actors only follow informal 
institutions with a certain probability; the possibility of deviant behaviour always exists. This 
characteristic assumes that formal institutions mainly stem from informal institutions. (North 
1993, 18-19)12 
 
The capturing the success: the politicians’ interest index13 
The theoretical foundation of politicians’ interest index (PII) is the public choice theory, 
therefore during the development of the PII we started out from the assumption that 
politicians maximize their individual utility, they are rational actors and under democratic 
circumstances elected politicians compete for re-election.14 To achieve this, the objective of 
the politicians is to have the confidence of the citizens grow in the civil services led by them 
and indentified with them, and to have themselves re-elected personally. The indicator 
contains two variables with equal weights. One originates from the databases of the World 
Value Survey and the European Value Survey, and it measures the citizens’ confidence in the 
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 See the values of the PII in the appendix, table 3. 
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 As Buchanan (2003, 1) remind us “[t]he hard core in public choice can be summarized in three 
presuppositions: (1) methodological individualism, (2) rational choice, and (3) politics-as-exchange.” 
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civil services. The other indicator shows the number of prime ministers in office during the 
given decade in the given country. The magnitude of trust towards the public administration 
was analysed based on the first WVS / EVS surveys after the NPM reforms.15 
The other indicator is the number of prime ministers in office for the given decades. This 
indicator specifically measures the change in the primary leader of the country. Since we wish 
to capture the political stability of the politicians and not the stability of the political system 
and the political parties, we are not looking at the number of government changes; rather the 
changes in the prime minister were considered. 
 
Figure 3. 
The structure of the politicians’ interest index 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
The big advantage of the indicator is that it is simple, but at the same time it has a number 
shortcoming as well. One the one hand, a change in the prime minister does not cover all 
sectors and public administration levels affected by the NPM reform. It is also confounded by 
the fact that a decline in the confidence towards civil services does not necessarily cause 
immediate political losses, since it is conceivable that a politician can compensate by other 
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The decade of NPM 
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results or symbolic actions the weaker performance attained in this area. The chief 
shortcoming of this indicator is that numerous uncontrollable factors can influence its value, 
and it is not exclusively dependent on the performance of the NPM reforms. Nevertheless 
based on Frattore, Dubois and Lapenta (2012, 225) observation, by which NPM issues are 
prominent in the political communication even in countries that is characterized by a legalistic 
administrative tradition, we can assume that the NPM reforms significantly influenced the 
value of this indicator. As Pollitt (2007, 10-25) also considers discursive convergence as the 
strongest, we share this opinion, that the NPM reforms in most Anglo-Saxon and Northern 
and Western European countries has determined the public discourse, while we have to admit 
that in case of the Central and Eastern European countries this is less true.16 
 
The description of the statistical analysis 
All together thirty-one democratic, market economies are analyzed at the system level, 
where the analytical units are nation-states, which are examined based on their reforms 
realized in various time intervals.17 Thus, in line with the implementation of the reforms in the 
case of Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States data was used from the 1980s, in the case of certain Western, Northern and Southern 
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 In his book chapter Van de Walle (2007) measured the magnitude of confidence towards the civil services by 
the question of the WVS, which was also applied by us. In his writing he identified numerous problems related 
to this question of the WVS, among others for instance that the English term civil service was translated 
differently in the various countries. Based on the analysis of Van de Walle (2007) we can state that the socio-
demographic and the socio-economic variables explain to only a very small extent the level of trust towards the 
public administration. This suggest that we have a very good reason to believe that there is a strong relationship 
between the values of the PII and the success of the NPM reforms. About the measurement of the effectiveness 
of the NPM reforms see also: (Barzelay 2001; Ferlie and Steane 2002; Gualmini 2008; Hood 1995; Jones and 
Kettl 2003; Pollitt and Summa 1997; Torres 2004; Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 2011; Wollmann 2003). 
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 Before running the model and presenting the results we would like to highlight one important condition. We 
consider the thirty-one countries included in the analysis as the population, in other words we do not consider the 
countries chosen by us as a sample. It follows that the conclusions of this study cannot be applied to and 
generalized for the other countries of the world. The reason for this is that the subject of our analysis, the NPM 
movement, is only able to exert positive influence in a democratic and pro-market environment, since the roots 
of the movement go back to such economic theories (new institutional economics, public choice theory), which 
cannot be applied in authoritarian and anti-market environments. There is an important methodological 
implication of that, we consider the countries included in the analysis as a population and not a sample, since this 
way the significance level analysis loses its importance. In addition, there is no need for those analyses that 
assess in what magnitude the sample fits the characteristics of the population. 
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European countries data was used from the 1990s,18 while in the case of the Central and 
Eastern European countries19 we used data from the 2000s.20 
Our model was verified through statistical methods and secondary sources. We used SPSS 
software for the statistical running of the model. First, the number of the proxy variables used 
for capturing informal and formal institutions found on the left side of the model was reduced. 
To achieve this, a principal component analysis was carried out. 
 
Figure 4. 
The factor loadings and communalities of the proxy-variables of the formal institutions 
The name of the proxy-variables Factor loadings Communalities 
Trust 0,79 62,65% 
Feeling of Happiness 0,91 82,27% 
Tolerance 0,72 51,80% 
Opinion about market coordination and 
bureaucratic coordination and private 
and state ownership 
(Positive values mean bureaucratic 
coordination and state ownership are 
preferable) 
-0,82 67,30% 
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 Those countries, which carried out the reforms mostly during the 1990s: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
19
 The following Central and Eastern European countries were included in the analysis: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
20
 Williamson’s (1998) model defines the possible time intervals of each institutional level establishes that 
informal institutions in the long-run (102 and 103 years), formal institution in the mid-run (10 and 102 years) are 
unchangeable, while the factors linked to the government can be changed even in the short-run (1 and 10 years). 
However, when collecting the data for the model, we did not take into account the Williamsonian time intervals 
assigned to each level. According to Williamson’s model in case of informal and formal institutions it would 
have been enough to gather data from only time period, from the 1980’s, so before the earliest appearance of the 
NPM movement. However, we did not follow that, because Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) research unequivocally 
highlighted that the proxy variables, stem from the WVS and EVS, and used by us change even in the shorter-
run. At the same time Inglehart and Baker (2000, 49) point out that this does not contradict Williamson’s theory, 
since the changes in the data of the WVS and the EVS do not affect the core of culture. By assuming the changes 
of descriptive, independent variables, we do not make a mistake at all, at worst we are carrying out unnecessary 
work, as this way we can guarantee that the cause (independent variables) in time precede the effect (dependent 
variable). 
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External / internal factors are decisive 
in life 
(Positive values mean internal factors 
are decisive) 
0,8 64,32% 
Liberal / Conservative thinking 
(Positive values mean liberal thinking) 
0,67 44,70% 
Power distance index* -0,75 55,77% 
Individualism index* 0,68 46,43% 
Uncertainty avoidance index* -0,73 53,45% 
Indulgence vs. restraint index* 0,93 86,68% 
Source: Own figure. Remarks: * About the meaning and the accurate definitions of the proxy-
variables of Hofstede see: (Hofstede 2011) 
 
As noted in figure 4. the high values of the principle component of the informal 
institutions are characteristic of such societies, where the people have the following self-
image: they are satisfied with their lives, the direction of which according to their opinion can 
be influenced by them, and they experience and express the joys of life. They turn to each 
other with trust, they tolerate the social differences, and they think liberally about the world, 
the power distance between people is small. They think as individuals, in other words 
individual freedom is important for them, they are willing to take risks, and they do not expect 
the state to create their welfare. They do not support the intervention of the state either in the 
economy or in their lives; rather they feel confidence in themselves, in the market and in free 
competition. When setting their objectives they rather focus on the short-run. Based on this 
description the countries, having high values for the principal component developed from the 
variables of the informal institutions, are tolerant, pro-market and pro-competition, 
individualist societies built on mutual trust with post modern value systems (Inglehart 1999), 
and their objective is to maximize individual happiness. 
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Figure 5. 
The factor loadings and communalities of the proxy-variables of the formal institutions 
 
The name of the Proxy-variable Factor loadings Communalities 
(Legal origins): Common -0,54 28,80% 
(Legal origins): Scandinavian 0,86 73,63% 
Electoral system: Single member district -0,55 30,36% 
Electoral system: Party-proportional representation 0,58 33,44% 
Chambers of parliament: Bicameral -0,51 26,23% 
Percentage of elected women in the Parliament in 
first election of the given decade 0,89 79,04% 
Competencies and responsibilities of local 
governments 0,59 34,62% 
Local governmental revenues / GDP 0,77 59%,40 
Local government employment share as percentage 
of total governmental employment 0,65 42,90% 
Source: Own figure 
 
As can be seen at the figure 6, the high values of the principle component of formal 
institutions is characteristic of such countries, which have Scandinavian type legal system, 
proportional and party list electoral system and they have such unicameral parliament in 
which there is a high proportion of female representatives. In addition, in these countries the 
position of local governments is stabile; they have significant resources, which are 
complemented by significant authority and human resources. The Anglo-Saxon legal 
traditions, the electoral system built on simple majority, or the bicameral parliament have a 
negative correlation with the value of the principle component. 
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In summary, we can see that Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon countries provide quite a 
similar informal institutional environment for the NPM reforms, at the same time in the case 
of the formal institutions they differ significantly; both their political and their legal systems 
significantly differ. 
In the case of the continental countries the informal institutions of the Central and Eastern 
European countries drastically differ from the norm and tradition systems of the societies of 
both the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Their formal institutions also differ 
from the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon countries taking a middle position between the 
two extreme points.  
Among the German speaking countries, Switzerland is a special case already because of 
its multilingual environment and its direct democratic political system, but in the case of 
informal and formal institutions it also stands closer to the Anglo-Saxon countries than to 
Germany and Austria. These two German speaking countries, based on the scores received in 
regards to the informal institutional main component, are the most market-friendly and the 
most open cultures of continental Europe, while their formal institutions differ from the 
Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon countries, and they form a well defined continental group 
with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe. 
France, Belgium and the southern countries of Europe received significantly lower scores 
in the case of informal institutions, but – with the exception of Portugal and Greece – they 
still attained higher scores than their Central and Eastern European counterparts. 
In the case of formal institutions we can differentiate three groups: Scandinavian, 
Continental and Anglo-Saxon types of formal institutional systems. While in the case of 
informal institutions the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon countries do not differ from each 
other – both groups received high scores – the Western European countries scored lower on 
the informal institutions than the previous country groups and scored higher than the Central 
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and Eastern European and Southern European countries. In the Figure below, we summarized 
the scores received for the informal and formal institutions main components 
 
Figure 6.  
The values of the informal and formal intuitional factors in the case of the 31 countries 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
 
After the principle component analysis, our model is statistically tested based on a path 
analysis model, which consists of the series of related multivariate linear regressions. The 
success of the NPM reforms is captured through the politicians’ interest index. The path 
analysis models are in reality a series of regression models suitable for testing the cause and 
effect relationship deductively devised by the researcher.21 By developing a path analysis 
model a probable causal direction can be tested. The causality applied in the current study is 
the following: 
 
                                                           
21
 The linear multivariate regression analysis is explained in details by numerous books (Ember – Ember, 2009), 
so we can set aside the methodological introduction. 
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Figure 7.  
The direction of the causality of the model (exogenous variable: informal institutions)22 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
After running the path analysis models we can state that we found a strong correlation 
between the success of the NPM reforms captured by PII and the informal and formal 
institutions. The results of the statistical analysis of our model highlight that there is a strong 
and clear relationship between the success of the NPM reforms and informal institutions, 
while the effects of formal institutions are significantly more modest. The result of our 
statistical analysis is depicted in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  
The path analysis model of the institutional determinants of NPM  
 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
                                                           
22
 We know that numerous other factors influence the success of the NPM reforms (see for instance the 3. and 
the 4. blocks of our model), however we will obtain their combined influence and not the influence of each 
factor by itself. Let us assume that in regards to the success of the NPM reforms the combined explanatory 
power of the independent variables included in our model is 25%, then the influence of the other variables 
explains it in 75%. 
Informal 
institutions 
Formal 
institutions 
The success of NPM 
reforms based on the 
PII 
5 item success scale 
β1 = 0,03 γ = 0,11 
β
 2 = 0,58 
Informal 
institutions 
Formal 
institutions 
The success of NPM 
reforms 
70,7% 
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The standardized regression coefficient between the informal institutions and the PII is 
0,5833, while between the formal institutions and the PII is 0,03. Based on these, we can 
claim that the knowledge of the informal institutions significantly lowers more our 
uncertainty about the value of the politicians’ interest indicator, than the knowledge of formal 
institutions. If we consider that we can characterize the most stable and at the same time the 
deepest layers of the fabric of society with the main component of informal institutions, then 
our results point toward a strong connection. Informal institutions exert their effects through a 
number of ways; and still they also strongly define the realization of the politicians’ quite 
concrete goals. 
Results 
Following the evaluation of the models, now we can provide answers to the research 
questions of the current study. Let us look at our research questions! 
Do informal and formal institutions influence, and if yes, then how and to what extent, the 
opportunities for the successful implementation of the management techniques being 
introduced under the rubric of the NPM movement? 
Based on our analysis, informal institutions significantly influence the likelihood of the 
successful implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement, and they 
drastically reduce the uncertainty associated with it. We claim that those countries are able to 
successfully implement the management techniques belonging to this reform movement, 
where informal institutions are compatible with the approach of the NPM reforms, in other 
words where social norms support liberal, pro-market and pro-competition values. The NPM 
reforms strongly rely on the private sector, on the power of the market. For this, there is a 
need for a well functioning market economy, the essential prerequisite of which is that the 
members of society have confidence in themselves, they should be entrepreneurial, and they 
should not wait for the state to solve their problems. Those values, norms, habits, traditions 
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and national culture, which were captured by the positive values of the principal component 
of informal institutions, are closely fitting to the value system of the NPM reforms.23 
Based on the statistical model we claim that the principle component of formal 
institutions, by which the legal and political formal institutions of the countries were 
described, much more modestly influences the likelihood of the success of the NPM reforms, 
than the principle component capturing the informal part of the institutional Gestalt. 
Therefore, a reform belonging to the NPM movement can be successful even if formal 
institutions of the given country do not support this, as long as informal institutions support 
the implementation and realization of the reform. 
What kind of institutional framework, in other words informal and formal institutional 
constellation, is necessary in a given country for successfully implementing a reform 
belonging to the NPM movement? 
The reforms belonging to the NPM movement will most likely be successful, if they are 
introduced in an institutional Gestalt that fits the approach of the movement. Thus, the 
likelihood of the successful implementation is larger in such societies, where the members of 
society trust each other and the political institutions, satisfied with their lives and their 
financial state, individualists, confident in themselves and able to tolerate uncertainty and 
diversity, and have postmodern value systems. In case of formal institutions, our analysis did 
not yield such clear results. What we can claim with great likelihood is that the individual 
district electoral system fits better to the approach of the NPM reforms than the proportional 
electoral system, and the Anglo-Saxon legal origins fit better the NPM reforms than the 
Scandinavian legal origins, but even these statements do not mean a really decisive difference. 
Based on our analysis we can claim that it is not the formal institutions that define the success 
                                                           
23
 See also: (Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Pillay 2008; Verhoest 2011). These studies come to the same 
conclusion. 
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of the NPM reforms, their influence is minimal compared to the influence of informal 
institutions. 
Can a successfully applied NPM reform from a given institutional environment be 
successfully replicated in another, different institutional environment? 
Based on our study only a more complex answer can be provided to this research 
question. Since according to our results the influence of informal institutions dominates, an 
NPM reform can be successfully replicated in such institutional environment, where informal 
institutions are the same, even when formal institutions differ. This is the case for the Anglo-
Saxon and the Scandinavian countries: in regards to the NPM reforms the relevant informal 
institutional factors are almost the same. It is also important to highlight that the informal 
institutions of these countries are not identical, so the NPM reforms are realized differently.24 
Imitation, simple copying would not have been successful even in this case, as knowledge 
and experience sharing can only be successful, if they are fitted to the informal institutions of 
the given country. The more different the informal institutional systems of two countries, the 
bigger the chance of failure during the adaptation, and all the more the NPM reforms to be 
implemented must be modified. Beyond a certain level of institutional dissimilarity, reforms 
reflecting the values of the NPM movement can be realized only with a very small 
probability. In the case of the countries that have culture significantly differing from the 
values of the NPM movement, other types of reforms can be successful with greater 
probability. These can even lead to similar results as the NPM reforms. This question 
however demands further research. Based on the current study we cannot provide a 
                                                           
24
 In what respect the cultures of the given societies should be similar to each other depends on the given reform. 
We do not claim that the societies of the Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian countries show similarities in every 
aspects, even it is possible that they differ in more aspects than they are similar to each other, but their cultural 
traits necessary for the success of the NPM reforms are similar. That is why the Scandinavian countries able to 
successfully adapt the NPM reforms of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Let us not forget that in the case of the 
Scandinavian countries we do not speak of imitation, let us remember that the Scandinavian countries 
significantly altered the NPM reforms. (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) 
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scientifically valid answer to the question of what type of reforms could lead to similar results 
in the Central and Eastern European countries. 
Can the reforms belonging to the NPM movement be introduced and effectively sustained 
in the long-run taking into account the cluster of institutional and cultural pattern of 
Hungary? 
Based on institutional characteristic of Hungary (see figure 6.), we can render it probable 
that the implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement will be unsuccessful 
and the implemented reforms will not be sustainable in the long-run. Hungary can be 
characterized by such informal institutions, which are conflicting with the values of the NPM 
movement. Based on the statistical analysis of the data of the EVS from 1999, the following 
picture develops about the informal institutions of the Hungarian society: the country can be 
characterized by a medium level of trust and the majority of the population is dissatisfied with 
their lives. Among the Central and Eastern European countries included in the analysis, 
Hungarians have the least confidence in the markets, and the most support for bureaucratic 
coordination. This is understandable in light of the fact that the majority of the population 
feels that they do not control their lives; rather it is external factors that influence its course. 
Hungarians – based on the analysis – are highly intolerant, are rather uncertainty avoiders, 
and can be characterized by strongly conservative attitudes. Also, their relationships are 
characterized by high power distance. 
Based on this we can claim that the approach of the NPM movement is foreign to the 
traditions of the Hungarian society and significantly differs from the norms and traditions 
accepted by the members of society. Because of the social norms and culture, the Hungarian 
society and the public administration most likely will not be able to accept the reform 
concepts suggested by the NPM movement; either during their implementation or during their 
operations they will fall through. It is conceivable that instruments belonging to certain NPM 
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movements will survive in the longer run, but they will be distorted and they will adjust to the 
informal institutions of Hungary, and cannot be characterized by the values of the NPM. 
Based on the literature we can claim that in these cases these instruments do more harm than 
good for the public sector of the given country. During the reform of the Hungarian public 
sector the toolkit of the NPM movement should not be applied or imitated in its entirety, it 
should be fitted to the Hungarian institutional environment, which could demand such levels 
of modifications after which we cannot consider the modified instruments as a part of the 
NPM movement anymore. Out of the practices of the more developed countries, it worth to 
examine principally the public sector reforms of the Southern European countries, since the 
informal institutions of these countries stand the closest to ours, or we have to find our 
independent way to go. We believe that we should rather choose the later path. 
 
1. Main findings and summary 
The most important yield of the study is that it proved through statistical analyses that 
informal institutions, in other words norms, traditions, habits, beliefs and social culture that 
are followed by the members of society, play a decisive role in deciding whether the reforms 
related to the new public management movement can be successfully introduced in a given 
country or not. If the informal institutions of a country differ from the approach of the NPM 
movement, then the low probability of the successful implementation should prompt 
professional practitioners to fit the reforms to be introduced to the informal institutional 
facilities of the country. The practical relevance of this statement is significant: it can even 
influence the aid policy of the European Union. If the culture or traditions of a new member 
state differ from the cultures of the leading countries of the EU, then the European Union 
takes up a huge risk, if it encourages / forces the new member states to implement such 
reforms that do not fit the informal institutions of the given countries. In recent years the 
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European Union has spent significant amounts on the support of the reforms in the new 
member states, a decisive part of which can be linked to the NPM movement. Based on the 
current study we can claim that these reforms will be unsuccessful with high probability, if 
during their implementation they do not sufficiently take into consideration the informal 
institutional environment characteristic of the given country. In most cases the result is 
squandered billions, or the development of non-sustainable systems, or even worse, distorted 
reforms causing effects contrary to the objectives. At the beginning of this paper we alluded 
to some case studies, which analyzed the introduction of the NPM in Africa and Asia and they 
pointed out the seriously negative effects of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement. 
These cases are “trivial” in the sense that in the instances of non-democratic systems the 
toolkit of the NPM movement works in a dysfunctional manner. Based on the current study 
we can claim that even under democratic and market economic conditions the success of the 
NPM reforms cannot be guaranteed. 
We can claim based on the results of the study that the possible introduction of the NPM 
reforms depends decisively on the informal institutions of society and to a smaller extent on 
its formal institutions (the necessary condition of success), while the magnitude of the success 
of the already implemented reforms is determined also by the culture of the public 
administration, and other factors not examined (3. and 4. blocks of our model) in the study 
(sufficient condition). 
We consider the modelling and the description of the differences between the influences of 
formal and informal institutions on the NPM reforms as an important result. During our 
analysis it emerged that the possibility of the implementation of the NPM reforms depends on 
informal institutions, which change slowly and which are givens for politicians and for 
business people at a given point in time. The NPM movement during the past thirty years can 
be characterized as a wave of fashion, which was followed by politicians in order to maximize 
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votes. Let us assume that a politician, say that the country’s minister of economy, intuitively 
realizes that the reforms belonging to the NPM movement and demanded by the member of 
society, or by a part of it (for instance the scientific elite), or even by an external organization 
(EU, IMF, etc.) do not fit the country’s culture. In this case, he or she keeps public interests in 
mind, if he or she does not embark on such reform that is doomed to failure with great 
probability, so instead he or she handles the pressure laid on him or her rhetorically. Let us 
not forget that explaining why he or she does not support the implementation of a reform, 
which is successful in another country, is a quite difficult and dangerous political task. 
According to Pollitt, the NPM movement is in a great part the series of such kind of “reform 
talk” (Pollitt 2007, 14), which he calls discursive convergence. This could seem as an act of 
compensation, but based on the results of our research it is conceivable that in the decisive 
majority of the cases politicians act correctly, when they do not introduce a given NPM 
reform. Based on our results, the discursive convergence can be interpreted as a rational and 
effective defence mechanism. 
Our model also points out that those cultural attributes, which are labelled by Inglehart 
(1999) as postmodern, could play a dominant role in the success of the NPM reforms. This is 
by all means thought-provoking, when we decide on whether to recommend or not the 
implementation of the reforms related to the NPM movement in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, where the societies of these countries cannot be characterized by postmodern 
attributes yet. By reviewing the results of the study, we can claim that between the informal 
institutions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the countries successfully 
implementing NPM reforms there exists such a huge gap that most likely these countries 
would not be able to adapt, in other words to tailor the NPM reforms to their own 
institutional environments. The examples of the Slovakian and Czech practices (Nemec 2010; 
Nemec, Merickova and Ochrana 2008), or the Hungarian cases (Hajnal 2008 and 2011) also 
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attest this. Based on our study, the reasons behind the failures should be found between the 
differences in the approach and value system necessary to the success of the NPM reforms 
and the informal institutional systems of the Central and Eastern European countries.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. 
The proxy-variables of informal institutions (Bold: proxies after the principal 
component analysis) 
The name of proxy-
variables Source 
Trust World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A165.- Most people can be trusted 
E085.- Confidence: Justice System 
E076.- Confidence: The Civil Services 
E075.- Confidence: Parliament 
Feeling of Happiness World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A008.- Feeling of happiness 
A170.- Satisfaction with your life 
C006.- Satisfaction with financial situation of 
household 
C033.- Job satisfaction 
Fairness World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Tolerance World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A035.- Important child qualities: tolerance and 
respect for other people 
A125.- Neighbours: People of a different race 
A129.- Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers 
F118.- Justifiable: homosexuality 
F120.- Justifiable: abortion 
Role of the state World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Opinion about market 
coordination and 
bureaucratic 
coordination and 
private and state 
ownership 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
E036.- Private vs state ownership of business 
E039.- Competition good or harmful 
C060.- How business and industry should be 
managed 
Obedience World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Responsibility taking or 
obviating World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
External / internal 
factors are decisive in 
life 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A173.- How much freedom of choice and control 
C034.- Freedom decision taking in job 
Individualism / 
Collectivism 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Risk taking or risk 
avoidance 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Working culture World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
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Political ideology (left – 
right) 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Liberal / Conservative 
thinking 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
D018.- Child needs a home with father and 
mother  
D019.- A woman has to have children to be 
fulfilled  
D022.- Marriage is an out-dated institution 
F126.- Justifiable: taking soft drugs 
Religiousness World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Breach of norms and 
rules 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Nationalism World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Power distance index (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Individualism index (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Masculinity index (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Uncertainty avoidance 
index 
(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Long-term orientation 
index 
(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Indulgence vs. restraint 
index 
(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Language family Katzner (2002) 
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 2. 
The proxy-variables of formal institutions (Bold: proxy-variables after the principal 
component analysis) 
The name of 
proxy-variables 
Source of the proxy-variables 
Magnitude of state 
centralization 
Economic Freedom of the World – Fraser Institute 
General government consumption spending as a percentage of total 
consumption 
Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
Government enterprises and investment 
Rule of Law 
Economic Freedom of the World – Fraser Institute 
Judicial independence 
Impartial courts 
Protection of property rights 
Integrity of the legal system 
Legal enforcement of contracts 
Magnitude of state 
control 
Economic Freedom of the World – Fraser Institute 
Hiring and firing regulations 
Centralized collective bargaining 
Price controls 
Legal tradition 
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
German legal origin 
French legal origin 
Scandinavian legal origin 
Type of 
government 
Minority government 
Coalition government 
Great-coalition government 
One-party ruled government 
Ideology of the 
government 
Conservative 
Liberal 
Social-democrat 
Electoral system 
Single 
member 
district 
First-past-the-post voting 
Multiple rounds (sequential vote) 
Party-proportional representation 
Combination 
Chambers of 
parliament 
Unicameral 
Bicameral 
Referendums 
Local and national wide 
Local 
National 
None 
The participation rate at the first election of the given decade 
Percentage of women in the Parliament in the given decade 
Competencies and responsibilities of local governments 
Local governmental revenues / GDP 
Local government employment share as percentage of total governmental employment 
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 3. 
The values of the politicians’ interest index in the31 countries involved in the analysis 
Countries 
The standardized 
mean of the 
Politicians’ 
Interest Index  
The number of 
prime ministers 
in office during 
the given decade 
in the given 
country 
Confidence in the civil 
services4 
USA 0,88 31 1,43 
United Kingdom 0,87 11 0,275 
Netherlands 0,60 21 0,31 
Canada 0,48 31 0,63 
Australia 0,27 21 -0,36 
New Zealand -0,48 31 -1,28 
Switzerland 1,25 02 0,476 
Denmark 0,91 22 0,93 
Portugal 0,87 22 0,85 
Ireland 0,65 42 1,54 
France 0,60 62 0,28 
Grece 0,60 42 -2,27 
Norway 0,55 32 0,76 
Austria 0,40 22 -0,09 
Germany 0,33 22 -0,24 
Spain 0,33 22 -0,24 
Belgium 0,31 32 0,30 
Finland 0,07 32 -0,20 
Sweden 0,03 42 0,30 
Italy -1,35 72 -0,76 
Slovakia 0,66 33 0,997 
Estonia 0,58 43 1,39 
Slovenia 0,05 53 0,90 
Latvia -0,09 63 1,18 
Hungary -0,17 43 -0,11 
Croatia -0,44 33 -1,21 
Romania -0,89 53 -0,98 
Poland -0,91 53 -1,02 
Bulgaria -1,22 43 -2,21 
Czech Republic -1,35 73 -0,76 
Lithvania -1,37 73 -0,81 
Source: Own figure 
Remarks:  1 Number of prime ministers between 1980 and 1990  
 
2
 Number of prime ministers between 1990 and 2000  
 
3
 Number of prime ministers between 2000 and 2010 
4
 The proportion of respondents who answered „A great deal” or „Quite a 
lot” to the following question: I am going to name a number of organisations. 
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For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it 
a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? The civil service. 
5
 Australia: WVS in the year of 1995, New Zealand: WVS in the year of 
1998, others: EVS in the year of 1990. 
6
 Finland: EVS in the year of 2000, Norway: WVS in the year of 1996, 
Switzerland:  WVS in the year of 1996, others: EVS in the year of 1999. 
 
7
 All the countries: EVS in the year of 2008. 
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Table 4. 
The applied datasets of EVS /WVS surveys in the case of the 31 countries included in the 
analysis 
Country 
I. wave II. wave III. wave IV. wave 
Year Dataset Year Dataset Year Dataset Year Dataset 
Australia 1981 WVS 1995 WVS         
United 
Kingdom 1981 EVS 1990 EVS         
Netherlands 1981 EVS 1990 EVS         
Canada 1982 EVS 1990 EVS         
New Zealand         1998 WVS     
USA 1982 EVS 1990 EVS         
 
Austria     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Belgium     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Denmark     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Finland     1990 EVS 2000 EVS     
France     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Grece         1999 EVS     
Ireland     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Germany     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Norway     1990 EVS 1996 WVS     
Italy     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Portugal     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Spain     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
Switzerland     1989 WVS 1996 WVS     
Sweden     1990 EVS 1999 EVS     
 
Bulgaria         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Czech 
Republic         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Estonia         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Croatia         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Poland         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Latvia         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Lithvania         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Hungary         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Romania         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Slovakia         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Slovenia         1999 EVS 2008 EVS 
Source: http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSDocs.jsp?Idioma=I 
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